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Not Quite Shays' Rebellion: Putting McConnell
v. Federal Election Commission
in Perspective
There is a political power struggle taking place within the Beltway.
The battle rages over neither the Presidency nor whether our troops
should come home from Iraq, but it does have broad effects that dictate
how citizens can support and interact with our government. Holding
regular elections for our representatives is the primary way that American citizens display a vote of confidence in the democratic system. We
depend on the integrity of the electoral system to ensure that our government is truly "of the people." The proponents of reform to the system
argue that a three-decade old law designed to minimize the influence of
money and corruption in campaigns has slowly broken down due to regulations that have minimized their effectiveness. Their opponents argue
that further significant restrictions on campaign coordination and
expenditures would hinder severely the First Amendment rights of
Americans.
Although legislation to change the Federal Election Campaign Act
of 1971 ("FECA") 1 developed for nearly a decade, the passage of the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 ("BCRA," or "McCain-Feingold," or "the Act")2 started the current debate, which consists of political skirmishes on a number of fronts. The preliminary battleground for
this debate has been the floor of Congress, where it took seven years 3 for
the Act's sponsors to push the bill through filibusters and disastrous
amendment proposals. The Federal Election Commission ("FEC" or
"Commission") was the next arena of contestation, as it disseminated
regulations to implement the law that did not reflect the intentions of
BCRA's sponsors. 4 After the legislative and regulatory arenas, the fight
moved to the judicial branch, the most recent battleground. Most significantly, the federal courts largely rejected Senator Mitch McConnell's
challenges to the constitutionality of the McCain-Feingold legislation in
1. Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (current version at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455 (2000 &
Supp. II 2002)).
2. Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81.
3. Sen. Russ Feingold, On the Issues: Campaign FinanceReform, http://feingold.senate.gov/
issues-campaign reform.html (last visited Aug. 18, 2005).
4. Press Release, Rep. Christopher Shays, Joint Statement by McCain, Feingold, Shays and
Meehan on Challenges to FEC Soft Money Regulations (Oct. 8, 2002), available at http://www.
house.gov/shays/news/2002/october/joint.htm.
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McConnell v. FEC.5 The FEC regulations that followed the bill have
also been challenged. The sponsors of BCRA in the House of Representatives claimed that the regulations were contrary to the spirit and the
language of BCRA in Shays v. FEC.6 The lasting effect of McConnell
will be determined by the final outcome of Shays, the amount of time it
would take to enact new legislation, and the willingness of future courts
to endorse McConnell's holdings.
Apart from the result of Shays, this debate is significant because it
is an exercise in democracy. Our government has methods of handling
such issues that are fundamental to our society, and each arena of contestation is a step in the democratic process at work. Additionally,
McConnell provides us with new judicial precedent, from which the
final campaign finance regulations will be drawn. Such a landmark case
has not been decided since Buckley v. Valeo,7 and it is unlikely that
political currents will be strong enough to overturn it any time soon. As
a result, the supporters of the McCain-Feingold legislation hope that in
the long term these new laws and regulations will restore a sorely
needed public confidence in the federal electoral campaign system,
which has been marred extensively by skepticism and circumvention of
its rules.
McConnell is the mid-point of a crucial round of debates that will
likely have lasting effects on the confidence that Americans have in their
democracy. Part I of this Comment explores the development of the
political arenas of contestation in this debate, and especially the FEC
regulations that have caused controversy over the interpretation of
McConnell in Shays. Part II analyzes how the federal courts address the
issues in McConnell and Shays. Part III highlights the battle at its most
recent stage, including the ways in which the parties involved are framing the issues concerning the regulations that implement BCRA, as well
as how the Shays circuit court opinion follows a similar line of reasoning
to the one presented at, and accepted by, the district court. Part IV evaluates the importance of McConnell in the larger context of this debate
and how the outcome of Shays will affect it.
I.

POLITICAL ARENAS

OF CONTESTATION

Throughout the twentieth century, political leaders in the United
States have attempted to stem the flow of political money that has
flooded each election cycle. The first federal civilian campaign finance
legislation was the Pendleton Civil Service Reform Act, which prohib5. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
6. 337 F. Supp. 2d 28 (D.D.C. 2004).
7. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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ited party contributions from government employees and created a class
of federal employment in which jobs were available only through competitive exams. 8 Further advances, such as the Tillman Act, the Hatch
Act, and the Taft-Hartley Act all limited contributions to campaigns in
attempts to increase the legitimacy of elections.9 By 1970, the spending
limits and disclosure requirements of the 1925 Federal Corrupt Practices
Act were made ineffective by efforts to circumvent it, and Congressmen
increasingly expressed concern about skyrocketing election costs and
their "implication regarding the influence of money in the electoral
process."'
The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 revolutionized campaign finance in two ways. Firstly, it limited the amount of money a
candidate could give to his or her own campaign and placed limits on
the amount a candidate could spend on television advertising.'' Secondly, it revised the regulations for disclosing contributions and expenditures by requiring candidates, political action committees (PACs), and
all party committees active in federal elections to file reports on a quarterly basis. 12 Over time, aggressive party fundraising practices and
weak or non-existent responses to such practices by the FEC significantly undermined FECA's restrictions on campaign funding.' 3 The
expanded use of soft money, unregulated monies by party committees,
and issue ads that were unregulated by Congress in the 1980s and 1990s
indicated to Congress that there was a significant need for reform. 4 By
the 2000 election cycle, national and congressional party committees
had broken all previous records for soft-money fundraising.15 Between
8.

CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER, CAMPAIGN FINANCE GUIDE,

A BRIEF HISTORY OF MONEY AND
http://www.campaignfinance

POLITICS: THE NINETEENTH CENTURY: SPOILS AND ASSESSMENTS,

guide.org/guide-30.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2005).
9. CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER, CAMPAIGN FINANCE GUIDE,
POLITICS: THE EARLY 1900S: PROGRESSIVE ERA LEGISLATION,

A BRIEF HISTORY OF MONEY AND
http://www.campaignfinanceguide.

org/guide-31.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2005); CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER, CAMPAIGN FINANCE
GUIDE, A BRIEF HISTORY OF MONEY AND POLITICS: THE NEW DEAL: EXPANDING THE LAW, http://
www.campaignfinanceguide.org/guide-32.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2005).
10. CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER, CAMPAIGN FINANCE GUIDE, A BRIEF HISTORY OF MONEY AND
POLITICS: THE 1950S AND 1960s: A CHANGING LANDSCAPE, http://www.campaignfinanceguide.
org/guide-33.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2005).
11. CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER, CAMPAIGN FINANCE GUIDE, A BRIEF HISTORY OF MONEY AND
POLITICS: THE FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN ACT: A NEW ERA OF REFORM, http://www.
campaignfinanceguide.org/guide-34.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2005).
12. Id.
13. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 124 n.7 (2003).
14. Id. at 142 n.44 ("The fact that the post-1990 explosion in soft-money spending on federal
electioneering was accompanied by a series of efforts in Congress to clamp down on such uses of
soft money ... underscores the fact that the FEC regulations permitted more than Congress, in
enacting FECA, had ever intended.").
15. Public Citizen, Soft Money and Campaign Finance Reform, http://www.citizen.org/
congress/campaign/issues/softmoney/index.cfm
(last visited Mar. 20, 2005) ("National
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1986 and 2002, Congress debated campaign finance reform legislation
almost annually, yet fervent partisan differences concerning the best way
16
to rewrite the laws made agreement on new legislation impossible.
A.

BCRA

Congress continued to play its role as the most common venue for
affecting change in campaign finance reform in 2002, when it became
the first arena of contestation in the current debate by passing the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act. The passage of BCRA was the result of a
number of years of laborious effort put forth by its sponsors and supporters. Senators John McCain (R-AZ) and Russell Feingold (D-WI) sponsored the original version of BCRA in 1995 that, in addition to
restricting the use of soft money, "called for voluntary spending ceilings
on congressional races, free broadcast time and reduced rate mailing
privileges to candidates who abided by the spending ceilings, and limits
on self-financing of candidate campaigns."' 7 After the first draft of the
McCain-Feingold legislation failed in the 104th Congress, the two original sponsors submitted to the Senate modified versions of the bill while
the House of Representatives sponsors, Congressmen Christopher Shays
(R-CT) and Martin Meehan (D-MA), submitted their versions to the
lower house. 18 All of their proposals were rejected by failing votes or
filibusters in each of the following two Congresses.' 9 After surviving an
assault of thirty-eight potentially crippling amendments, the McCainFeingold bill passed in the 107th Congress. 20 The Senate approved a
House version of the bill, eliminating the need for a conference committee and any reason to keep the bill from the desk of the President. 2'
into law on March 27, 2002 without the
George W. Bush signed BCRA
22
traditional public ceremony.
In order to increase candidates' accountability and decrease the
amount of corruption (and the appearance thereof) in federal campaigns,
BCRA made two major changes to FECA. It reinstituted limits on the
Republican party committees raised $249.9 million in soft money and spent $252.8 million in soft
money, while national Democratic party committees raised $245.2 million in soft money and
spent $244.8 million.").

16. CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER, CAMPAIGN FINANCE GUIDE, A BRIEF HISTORY OF MONEY AND
POLITICS: THE BIPARTISAN CAMPAIGN REFORM ACr: RESTORING THE REFORMS, http://www.
campaignfinanceguide.org/guide-35.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2005).
17. Public Citizen, Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, http://www.citizen.org/
congress/campaign/legislation/bcralaw/index.cfm

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

(last visited Mar. 20, 2005).

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER, supra note 16.
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sources and size of political party contributions, and regulated how corporate and labor treasury funds could be used in political elections.2 3
Specifically, as a contribution limit, BCRA prohibits federal candidates
and their party committees from obtaining "soft money," or funds "that
are not subject to the limitations, prohibitions, and reporting requirements" of the Act.2 4 As a result, the national party committees can only
use hard money raised in conformity with federal contribution limits to
pay for their political pursuits. 25 To address the problem of candidatespecific issue advertising, BCRA set forth a new definition of "electioneering communication" to replace the narrowing construction of FECA's
disclosure provisions, which were adopted by the Supreme Court in
Buckley. 26 The new definition encompasses any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication that:
(I) refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office;
(II) is made within(aa) 60 days before a general, special, or runoff election for the office
sought by the candidate; or
(bb) 30 days before a primary or preference election, or a convention
or caucus of a political party that has authority to nominate a candidate, for the office sought by the candidate; and
(III) in the case of a communication which refers to a candidate other
than President or Vice President, is targeted to the relevant
electorate.2 7
This definition, which provides broader regulation of the monies used to
pay for campaign advertising, essentially disregards the "magic words"
threshold that was established in Buckley to differentiate between
"express" and "issue" advocacy.2 8
B.

Federal Election Commission Regulations

The second major arena of contestation in the current campaign
finance battle lay in the regulatory power of the Federal Election Commission. This power arises from the 1974 amendments to FECA, which
established the Commission as an independent agency to enforce federal
election law, facilitate disclosure of contributions, expenditures, and
electioneering communications, and administer a public funding program.2 9 When BCRA was passed, the 2002 election cycle was
23. Id.

24. 2 U.S.C. § 441i(a)(1) (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
25. CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER, supra note 16.
26. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 189 (2003).
27. 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(a)(i) (Supp. II 2002).
28. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 189-91.

29. FEC,

THE

FEC

AND THE FEDERAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW

www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/fec-feca brochure.pdf.

(2004), available at http://
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approaching quickly and the proponents of the Act wanted the elections
to be run pursuant to the BCRA provisions, so Congress created an
expedited schedule for the FEC to draw up regulations in accordance
with the new law.3" Immediately after BCRA became law, interest
groups and Members of Congress, led by Senator McConnell, sued the
FEC in federal court to challenge the constitutionality of BCRA.3 1 Yet,
according to the expedited schedule established by BCRA, the Commission was not only required to churn out regulations before the 2002 election cycle, but also before the Supreme Court could decide Senator
McConnell's suit.
Some FEC Commissioners were sufficiently opposed to the passage of BCRA3 2 that they wrote a number of loopholes into the Commission's regulations. Some at the FEC were confident that BCRA
itself would be declared unconstitutional by the Court in McConnell
because they believed that the law's restrictions infringed upon the First
Amendment rights of American citizens. 33 As a result, it is likely that it
seemed unnecessary to write impenetrable FEC regulations in accord
with BCRA.34 When considering that the Chairman of the FEC, which
was created to implement the laws as passed by Congress, was opposed
to the passage of BCRA in the first place, it is not hard to imagine the
reasons why the regulations that were developed under BCRA have been
so contentious.
1.

SOFT MONEY

A few of the Commission's regulations came under the most fire
from proponents of the McCain-Feingold legislation. The first of the
controversial regulations consisted of responses to BCRA provisions in
30. See Bipartisan Campaign Reform (McCain-Feingold) Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155,
§ 402(c), 116 Stat. 81, 113 (requiring the FEC to promulgate rules within 90 days of BCRA's
enactment to carry out the provisions found in Title 1, which added new limitations on party,
candidate, and officeholder solicitations, and to promulgate within 270 days of its enactment the
remaining regulations).
31. See McConnell, 540 U.S. 93.
32. See Bradley A. Smith, McConnell v. Federal Election Commission: Ideology Trumps
Reality, Pragmatism, 3 ELECTION L.J. 345 (2004); see generally The Federal Election
Commission: Oversight Hearing Before the H. Comm. on H. Admin., 108th Cong. 5-6 (2004)
[hereinafter Oversight Hearing] (statement of Ellen Weintraub, Vice Chair, FEC).
33. See, e.g., Oversight Hearing, supra note 32, at 13 (statement of Bradley A. Smith, FEC
Chairman) ("I think most Americans have a right to be somewhat puzzled, nonetheless, to see a
whole body of law that says your political speech receives less constitutional protection than your
cross burning or your flag burning or your Internet pornography.").
34. See Smith, supra note 32, at 345 ("Historically, decisions that sharply curtail civil
liberties, as does McConnell, have not stood well the test of time, and are looked upon as black
moments in the Court's history.").
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Title I, entitled "Reduction of Special Interest Influence,"3 5 which were
meant to eliminate soft money from the federal campaign finance regime
by setting out prohibitions on various political actors' involvement with
it.3 6 Section 101 of BCRA provides that a "national committee of a
political party ... may not solicit, receive, or direct to another person a
contribution, donation, or transfer of funds or any other thing of value,
or spend any funds" that are not subject to FECA as amended by
BCRA.37 Yet, in drafting the soft-money regulations, the Commission
wrote rather narrow definitions for the terms "solicit" and "direct."3 8
For both terms, the FEC requires that someone "ask" another person
explicitly to contribute or make a donation to a campaign, albeit either
directly or indirectly through a conduit or intermediary.39
2.

STATE PARTY FUNDRAISERS

The sponsors of BCRA were concerned that federal candidates
would use state, district, or local party fundraisers as intermediaries to
get soft money. As a result, BCRA restricts federal candidates from
raising or receiving nonfederal money in connection with their campaigns.4 0 Yet, in the interest of protecting the First Amendment rights of
candidates, the law permits those candidates for federal office to "attend,
speak, or be a featured guest at a fundraising event for a State, district,
or local committee of a political party."'" However, the Commission, in
writing regulations to implement that law, penciled in more wiggle room
for federal candidates to participate in activities at nonfederal fundraising events than the sponsors had intended, by permitting them to "speak
at such events without restriction or regulation. 4 2 The BCRA proponents find this regulation objectionable because such a loophole would
allow federal candidates to solicit and direct soft money so long as they
do so within the nonfederal context permitted by the regulation.4 3
3.

FEDERAL ELECTION ACTIVITY

Congress also recognized that in trying to find ways to reduce special interest influence, it would be futile to implement an exclusion of
soft-money assistance to national party committees alone.4 4 Conse35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act §§ 101-103.
Shays v. FEC, 337 F. Supp. 2d 28, 72-73 (D.D.C. 2004).
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act § 101(a) (emphasis added).
See 11 C.F.R. § 300.02(m)-(n) (2005).
Id.
See 2 U.S.C. § 441i(e), (b)(2)(C) (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
Id. § 441i(e)(3).
11 C.F.R. § 300.64(b) (2005).
Shays v. FEC, 337 F. Supp. 2d 28, 88 (D.D.C. 2004).
See The Constitutionand Campaign Reform: Hearings on S. 522 Before the S. Comm. on
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quently, BCRA prohibits individuals from donating nonfederal funds to
state and local party committees to help finance federal election activity.4 5 In trying to prevent circumvention of this prohibition, Congress
required that state and local parties spend federal funds to pay the salary
of any employee who spends more than 25% of her compensated time
on activities in connection with a federal election.46 Pursuant to its duty
to write regulations reflecting the spirit of the law, the Commission
promulgated a regulation addressing wages for state and local party
committee employees, but to some extent the regulation allows states to
determine for themselves from which funds these employees may be
paid:
Salaries and wages for employees who spend more than 25% of
their compensated time in a given month on Federal election activity
or activities in connection with a Federal election must not be allocated between or among Federal, non-Federal, and Levin accounts.
Only Federal funds may be used. Salaries and wages for employees
who spend 25% or less of their compensated time in a given month

on Federal election activity or activities in connection with a Federal
47
election shall be paid from funds that comply with State law.
4.

DE MINIMIS EXEMPTION

In spite of Congress's great concern regarding the effect of soft
money on federal election activity, the Levin Amendment to BCRA
carves out an exception to the general rule.4 8 It allows state and local
party committees to pay for certain types of federal election activity with
an allocated ratio of hard money and "Levin funds," which are funds
raised within an annual limit of $10,000 per person.49 The rules that the
Commission created for Levin funds do not address completely the rules
that were originally set out by Congress in BCRA, in that the Commission proposes a reporting exemption for those who spend a minimal
amount on federal election activities:
The disbursements for allocable Federal election activity that
exceed in the aggregate $5,000 in a calendar year may be paid for
entirely with Federal funds or may be allocated between Federal
funds and Levin funds . . . . Disbursements for Federal election
Rules and Admin., 106th Cong. 4-7 (2000) (statement of Bobby R. Burchfield, Partner, Covington
& Burling).
45. 2 U.S.C. § 441i(b)(1).
46. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 170-71 (2003) (explaining that otherwise a party might
use soft money to pay for the equivalent of a full-time employee engaged in federal electioneering
by dividing the federal workload among multiple employees).
47. 11 C.F.R. § 300.33(c)(2) (2005) (emphasis added).
48. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 162.
49. Id. at 162-63.
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activity that may be allocated and that aggregate $5,000 or less in a
calendar year may be paid for entirely with Federal funds, entirely
with Levin funds, or may be allocated between Federal funds and
Levin funds ...
5.

50

CONTENT STANDARDS FOR COORDINATED EXPENDITURES

The second group of controversial FEC regulations consisted of
responses to BCRA provisions in Title II, entitled "Communications:
Non-candidate Campaign Expenditures," which encompass both "coordinated" and "electioneering" communications. 5 As early as Buckley v.
Valeo, the Supreme Court acknowledged that "expenditures controlled
by or coordinated with the candidate and his campaign might well have
virtually the same value to the candidate as a contribution and would
pose similar dangers of abuse," and should be treated as indirect contributions subject to FECA's source and amount limitations. 2 Before
BCRA was passed, the FEC regulation on coordinated communications
placed substantial weight on whether a communication had resulted
from a "substantial discussion or negotiation ...

the result of which is

collaboration or agreement" between the candidate and an external contributor. 3 Upon the passing of BCRA, Congress instructed the FEC to
repeal the existing regulations and promulgate new ones that require
neither an agreement nor formal collaboration between the parties to
establish coordination, so that true instances of coordination would not
be overlooked. 4
As instructed, the Commission drafted new regulations, which
define a coordinated communication as "[a] communication [that] is
coordinated with a candidate, an authorized committee, a political party
committee, or an agent of any of the foregoing when the communication
[] is paid for by a person other than the candidate, authorized committee, [or] political party committee," and the communication satisfies one
of the Commission's regulatory content standards and one of the conduct standards. 55 The content that satisfies the definition is:
(1) A communication that is an electioneering communication under

11 CFR 100.29.
(2) A public communication that disseminates, distributes, or republishes, in whole or in part, campaign materials prepared by a candi50. 11 C.F.R. § 300.32(c)(4) (2005).
51. Bipartisan Campaign Reform (McCain-Feingold) Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155,
§§ 201-204, 211-214, 116 Stat. 81.
52. Buckley v.Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,46 (1976).
53. 11 C.F.R. § 100.23(c)(2)(iii) (2001) (repealed 2002).
54. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act § 241(b)-(c), 116 Stat. at 94-95.
55. 11 C.F.R. § 109.21(a) (2005).
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date, the candidate's authorized committee, or an agent of any of the
foregoing, unless the dissemination, distribution, or republication is
excepted under 11 CFR 109.23(b). For a communication that satisfies this content standard, see paragraph (d)(6) of this section.
(3) A public communication that expressly advocates the election or
defeat of a clearly identified candidate for Federal office.
(4) A communication that is a public communication, as defined in
11 CFR 100.26, and about which each of the following statements in
paragraphs (c)(4)(i), (ii), and (iii) of this section are true.
(i) The communication refers to a political party or to a clearly
identified candidate for Federal office;
(ii) The public communication is publicly distributed or otherwise publicly disseminated 120 days or fewer before a general, special, or runoff election, or 120 days or fewer before a primary or
preference election, or a convention or caucus of a political party that
has authority to nominate a candidate; and
(iii) The public communication is directed to voters in the jurisdiction of the clearly identified candidate or to voters in a jurisdiction
in which one or more candidates of the political party appear on the
ballot.5 6
In explaining the reasoning for this regulation, the Commission
described the content standard of paragraph (c)(4)(ii) as a "safe harbor"
provision, in that "communications that are publicly disseminated or distributed more than 120 days before the primary or general election will
not be deemed 'coordinated' under this particular content standard under
any circumstances." 5 7
C.
1.

Judiciary

MCCONNELL

V. FEC

Numerous provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of
2002 and regulations promulgated by the Commission have been, and
are still being, disputed in the third arena of contestation: the federal
courts of the United States. When Senator McConnell filed the first of
eleven consolidated actions challenging BCRA as unconstitutional, the
case was put before a special three-judge panel at the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (the "special panel" opinion in
McConnell).58 The challenge by Senator McConnell and the other opponents of the McCain-Feingold bill was largely unsuccessful, but produced a nearly eight hundred page opinion from the district court special
panel. The per curiam opinion upheld most of Title II as constitu56. Id. § 109.21(c)(I)-(4).
57. Coordinated & Independent Expenditures, 68 Fed. Reg. 421, 430 n.2. (Jan. 3, 2003).
58. McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176 (D.D.C. 2003).
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tional,5 9 and each of the judges wrote a separate opinion concerning the
constitutionality of Title I, which addressed the BCRA restrictions on
soft-money donations.6 ° Most of the provisions of the law were upheld
at the district court, so the regulations authored by the FEC to accommodate them were also left standing, 6 at least until the Supreme Court
could make a final decision on BCRA's constitutionality.
The proponents of BCRA also won the next round of the campaign
finance reform debate, as refereed by the Supreme Court in McConnell.
The Court considered each of the five titles of BCRA separately, and
three of the more liberal Justices joined in an opinion concerning Titles I
and II, as delivered by Justices Stevens and O'Connor (the majority
opinion in McConnell).62 The majority significantly lowered the hurdles
for the McCain-Feingold legislation in the race for legitimacy. By
upholding more provisions of BCRA than the district court panel had, 63
the McConnell majority was able to bring to prominence its ardent support for BCRA and its disdain for the previously existing campaign
finance situation that Senators McCain and Feingold fought to eliminate.
At that point, most of BCRA remained intact, as did the corresponding
FEC regulations.

2.

SHAYS

V. FEC

The regulations promulgated by the Commission set the stage for
the most recent battleground in the final arena of contestation. Representatives Shays and Meehan, who had been the sponsors of BCRA in
the House, challenged nineteen of the FEC's regulations on the grounds
that they fail to abide by the language and congressional purposes of
BCRA. 64 In response, District Court Judge Kollar-Kotelly, who participated in the per curiam opinion written by the original special panel in
McConnell, heeded the call of the majority in Congress and struck down
fifteen of the Commission's regulations, allowing BCRA to remain relatively unhindered.6 5 The Federal Election Commission was left to
redraft most of the stricken regulations and appeal the decision on five
regulations that it thought were particularly meritorious.6 6
The Commission did not fare any better at the United States Court
59. Id. at 184-86.
60. See id. at 184.
61. See id. at 187.
62. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 114 (2003).
63. See, e.g., id. at 199-202 (overruling the district court's rejection of a BCRA section that
requires disclosure of executory contracts for electioneering communication).
64. Shays v. FEC, 337 F. Supp. 2d 28, 35 (D.D.C. 2004).
65. Id. at 130.
66. See Shays v. FEC, 414 F.3d 76 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
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of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which did not believe
that these five regulations had enough merit to reemerge at the circuit
level. 67 Although some of the reasoning of the issues differed between
the district and circuit courts, both followed similar themes in their decision-making. When the D.C. Circuit denied the Commission's petition
for rehearing en banc,68 the FEC retained the responsibility of drafting
new regulations in accordance with BCRA.
II.

ANALYSIS OF THE DYNAMIC AT THE DISTRICT COURT

A.

Shays' Broad Reading of McConnell

To determine the validity of the FEC's regulations construing
BCRA, it is of the utmost importance to understand BCRA's provisions
and the purposes of each. Consequently, the debate over BCRA itself
becomes naturally intertwined with the debate over the regulations that
follow. Likely acknowledging this, Judge Kollar-Kotelly stayed the proceedings in Shays until the Supreme Court published its decision in
McConnell,6 9 and relied heavily on the majority decision. Moreover, in
interpreting the Supreme Court's decision very broadly and conspicuously failing to question any of the majority's claims to any substantive
extent, Judge Kollar-Kotelly essentially affirmed her own opinion from
the special panel in McConnell. There are a number of examples in
Shays that illustrate the court's unquestioned deference to the Supreme
Court.
In its treatment of the FEC's regulations concerning the definitions
of "solicit" and "direct" for the purpose of implementing the coordinated
expenditure provisions of BCRA, the district court in Shays adopted the
purported goal of the law, as put forth by the Supreme Court majority in
McConnell.7" Although Justice Kennedy found that the purpose of the
section itself is misguided because it does not narrowly address the true
problem of a "demonstrable quid pro quo danger,"7 Judge KollarKotelly's view was more in line with the majority's view.7 2 The FEC's
argument over the definitions of the words "solicit" and "direct" evi67. Id. at 79.
68. Id.

69. Shays, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 36.
70. Id. at 73 (" '[Tihe main goal of § 323(a) is... [to] return to the scheme that was approved
in Buckley and that was subverted by the creation of the FEC's allocation regime, which permitted
the political parties to fund federal electioneering efforts with a combination of hard and soft
money."' (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 142 (2003))).
71. McConnell, 540 U.S at 298 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
72. See McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 652 (D.D.C. 2003) ("BCRA restores in
large measure, the federal campaign finance structure that had functioned effectively prior to the
rise of seductive 'soft money.'").
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dences some concern for those who may violate the law unintentionally,7 3 but Judge Kollar-Kotelly decided that "[g]iven [ ] the aim of the
statutory provision.., it is clear to the Court that Congress intended that
the term 'solicit' would cover conduct beyond asking for [soft money] to
be given to other entities." 4
The Shays district court opinion also construed the Supreme Court
decision in McConnell broadly in its consideration of the BCRA provision outlining that employees of state, district, or local committees of a
political party who spend more than twenty-five percent of their time
working on a federal election campaign are engaged in "Federal election
activity." 7 5 The corresponding FEC regulation not only addressed those
situations, but also purportedly closed a gap in the law by addressing
situations in which a qualifying employee spends twenty-five percent or
less of her time working on a federal campaign.7 6 The plaintiffs claimed
that this extra regulation violated the Orloski v. Federal Election Commission standard,7 7 in that it unduly compromised the purpose of the Act
by strengthening the FECA restrictions.7 8 Judge Kollar-Kotelly did not
address the BCRA provision specifically at the special panel in McConnell, but found in Shays that the Supreme Court's determination, that
this provision is a prophylactic rule, was sufficient to determine that the
FEC regulation compromises "the Act's purposes of preventing circumvention of its national party committee nonfederal money ban and stemming the flow of nonfederal money into activities that impact federal
elections."7 9
Even though the district court's holdings in Shays mostly follow
Judge Kollar-Kotelly's special panel opinion, the broad interpretation
that Shays has given to the Supreme Court majority's decision in
McConnell has not only served to benefit the proponents of BCRA. The
law's restriction regarding the governing of state party fundraisers
makes an allowance for federal candidates to attend and speak at the
fundraising events for a state or local political party.8" Plaintiff Shays
challenged the FEC regulation that authorizes federal candidates to
speak at those events without restriction, 8 but the district court found
that the McConnell majority acknowledged that Congress provided for
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Shays, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 74.
Id. at 78.
Id. at 113.
See 11 C.F.R. § 300.33(c)(2) (2005).
795 F.2d 156, 164 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
Shays, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 113.
Id. at 114.
2 U.S.C. § 441i(e)(3) (Supp. I 2002).
11 C.F.R. § 300.64(b) (2003).
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limited nonfederal fundraising for federal candidates and officeholders,
even on behalf of state and local parties.82 Even though the district court
used its broad reading to uphold the FEC regulation preliminarily, it
struck down the regulation on a technicality in favor of the BCRA
proponents.8 3
The most striking instance of the district court in Shays reading
McConnell broadly and, moreover, reaffirming Judge Kollar-Kotelly's
decision at the special panel, was in its discussion of content standards
for coordinated communications under Title II. In his challenge of the
regulation, plaintiff Shays highlighted that unless the communication in
question amounts to "express advocacy" or is a republication of a candidate's own materials, the regulation only restricts coordinated communication within 120 days of an election, primary, or convention.8 4 Since
Buckley, courts have interpreted the express advocacy test as a constitutional boundary on the government's power to regulate campaign-related
communications.8 In rejecting the Commission's regulation, the Shays
district court opinion acknowledged Justices Stevens' and O'Connor's
statement that: "the unmistakable lesson from the record in this litigation
. ..is that Buckley's magic-words requirement is functionally meaningless." 86 The Supreme Court majority paraphrased this conclusion from
the opinions of the special panel, including that of Judge KollarKotelly.87 The district court went further and noted that using express
advocacy is an ineffective campaign strategy that would seldom be used
even if campaigns were permitted to do so.88
B.

The Continuation of McConnell in Shays

The Shays district court read McConnell as broadly as it did not
simply because Judge Kollar-Kotelly shares a similar perspective with
the Supreme Court majority or because of her own opinion as a member
of the McConnell special panel. The nature of this closely fought cam82. Shays, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 91 (acknowledging that § 441i(e)(1)(B) doubles the limits on
how much individuals can contribute to, or at the behest of, federal candidates and officeholders,
while restricting the use of the additional funds to activities not related to federal elections).
83. Id. at 92-93 (striking down the regulation based on an APA violation).
84. Id. at 57.
85. See McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 600-03 (D.D.C. 2003) (discussing case law
that construed express advocacy as a constitutional test).
86. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 193 (2003).
87. McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 534 ("The uncontroverted testimony of political
consultants confirm that there is no difference between campaign advertisements that contain
words of express advocacy and candidate-centered issue advertisements that are designed to
influence federal elections but that do not use the 'magic words' of Buckley.").
88. See Shays, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 58 (citing McConnell, 540 U.S. at 193); see also
McConnell, 540 U.S. at 194 n.77.
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paign finance reform debate created the need for Shays to look closely at
McConnell because it is the most significant litigation on the subject
since Buckley. That a small period of time passed between these two
cases is evident: there have been neither more recent cases than McConnell, nor laws passed since BCRA to affect the body of precedent for the
Shays court to construe. This is especially apparent in McConnell and
Shays when the court makes reference to Buckley, a three-decade old
case that serves as the previous landmark of jurisprudence on the subject. Since Buckley, there has been a tremendous amount of data collected, which has been used as evidence to promote the apparent need
for BCRA and support it in Congress and in the federal courts.89
Most of the legislative history testimony in Shays is pulled directly
from the congressional debates over BCRA.9 ° Congressmen and women
are uniquely among the most knowledgeable people to speak about the
issues that confront campaign finance reform, which creates an uncommon situation on Capitol Hill. Members of the House and Senate were
able to predict how the situation would have played out if the major
changes in FECA had not been affected by BCRA, because congressional campaigns had been evolving within the old system since FECA
was first enacted.9 1 Therefore, it is appropriate for the courts to find
inherent value in congressional testimony regarding candidates' past
experiences in running for office, as well as officeholders' experiences
in allowing various forms of access to people who provide donations to
them or their parties. This is especially true in the context of this debate
because much of the congressional testimony cited in both McConnell
and Shays took place within the same temporal proximity.
The Shays district court must have found particular importance in
the testimony submitted to the court by representatives before McConnell was decided at the special panel. In considering a suitable extent for
the restriction on federal candidates in their actions at state, district, or
local fundraisers, the Shays court recognized that the sponsors' intent
was for the rule to be unambiguous. 92 According to the court's broad
89. See generally McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 438-588.
90. See generally 147 CONG. REc. S2690, 2696 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 2002) (statement of Sen.
Feingold); see also 148 CONG. REC. S2096, 2145 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 2002) (statement of Sen.
Feingold).
91. See 147 CONG. REc. S2845, 2852-53 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 2001) (statement of Sen.
Hollings) ("It amused me the other day when they said we finally had some debate going on in the
Senate. The reason we have a debate is because this is the first subject we know anything about.
All the rest of it is canned speeches that the staff gives you, and you come out and you talk about
Kosovo, you talk about the defense budget, or you talk about the environment, and you read
scientific statements and everything-but we know about money. Oh boy, do we know.").
92. See Shays, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 90 (citing 148 CONG. REC. S2096, 2139 (daily ed. Mar. 20,
2002) (statement of Sen. McCain) (opining that the FEC regulation should prohibit federal
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reading of the McConnell majority, and in spite of its purported intent,
Congress provided for limited nonfederal fundraising for federal candidates and officeholders. 9 3 However, this did not end the consideration
of the regulation.
The district court in Shays asserted that it struck down the FEC
regulation because the Commission failed to adequately support its
rationale, which violated "the standards of reasoned decisionmaking."9' 4
However, it is likely that, just as the Shays district court found support
for other points of law in looking back to the previous litigation of
McConnell, the evidence presented to the special panel affected the
Shays district court decision on this regulation as much as the Commission's failure to justify it sufficiently. After all, prior to BCRA, candidates and officeholders, including Senator McConnell, solicited
donations to state parties, local parties, and tax-exempt organizations to
help their campaigns and the electoral causes of their parties.9 5
The testimony of people who put forth the effort to change the
entire election law regime is more important than that of those who simply worked with the old regulations. The sponsors of the McCain-Feingold legislation are the only parties who have been intimately engaged
in all of the arenas of contestation of the campaign finance battle. As a
result, their experiences define the stages of the battle itself, from its
nascent stages in the 104th Congress to the contentious litigation of the
present. The federal courts acknowledge a due deference to the sponsors
in describing the construction of the statute, which is particularly relevant when a court is trying to evaluate the validity of a regulation that is
borne from it.96 The district court in Shays observed this deference to
the bill's sponsors, as their comments effectively eliminated the FEC
regulation on coordinated communication content standards. The statements of Senators Feingold and McCain echoed the court's understanding that the Commission's BCRA regulations were meant to set a lower
standard for determining coordination than what had existed previously,
so that no cases of it would be overlooked.9 7 The court took from the
Senators' statements that the content and time of a broadcast are irrelecandidates and officeholders from

soliciting soft-money funds for any nonfederal party

committee)).
93. See 2 U.S.C. § 441i(e)(1)(B) (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
94. Shays, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 92-93.
95. See McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 480 (D.D.C. 2003).
96. See Shays, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 64 n.33 (quoting N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S.
512, 526-27 (1982) (finding that the statements of the sponsor of a statute ultimately enacted are
authoritative on the statute's construction)).
97. See 148 CONG. REC. S2096, 2145 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2002) (statement of Sen. Feingold)
(commenting that the FEC's narrowly defined standard of requiring collaboration or agreement
sets too high a bar to the finding of "coordination"); id. (statement of Sen. McCain) (noting that
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vant to whether coordinated communications expenditures should be
treated as contributions.9 8
C.

Common Sense in McConnell and Shays

The Senators' statements before Congress and prior to the passage
of BCRA were certainly important to the manner in which Shays interpreted the law and the FEC regulations. For the district court, the Senators' expertise and passion for campaign finance reform were likely less
compelling than their use of "common sense" reasoning in justifying it.
The theme of the superiority of "common sense" is highlighted by the
sponsors' emphasis on the subtleties of the pre-BCRA campaign finance
system. Justice Kennedy commented that campaign finance laws have a
foundation in exposing quid pro quo arrangements, in which congressional or other legislative votes are purchased for the fight price. 99 Justice Thomas believed, along a similar vein, that the nation's bribery laws
would be best suited to address the inadequacies that were so glaring
within the system. 10 0 In spite of this, Senator Feingold spoke of the
"many cases of coordination that result from de facto understandings,"
in which the affect of money on politics is not obvious to the public
eye.1°1 This is not a situation that BCRA supporters believe is appropriate for the "I know it when I see it" standard. Senator McCain brought
to light the simplicity of a "wink and nod" in that "informal understandings and de facto arrangements can result in actual coordination as effectively as explicit agreement or formal collaboration." ' 2
The air of "common sense" that blankets the campaign finance
reform debate also serves as a goal to be achieved by those who have
been engaging in each of the arenas of contestation. Long before
BCRA, a considerable amount of uncertainty surrounded a candidate's
ability to finance her campaign, both in terms of the legality and morality of certain methods of campaigning, as well as the effectiveness of
those methods. Survey and campaign reporting data collected between
the passage of FECA and BCRA indicate how successful campaign
finance techniques have evolved,10 3 and to what extent individuals and
other interests can gamer access to the government's ear by making
the sponsors of BCRA expected the FEC to draw up regulations to cover "coordination" whenever
it occurs, not simply when there has been an agreement or formal collaboration).
98. See Shays, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 64.
99. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 291-307 (2003) (Kennedy, J.,concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
100. Id. at 267 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
101. 148 CONG. REC. S2096, 2145 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2002) (statement of Sen. Feingold).
102. Id. (statement of Sen. McCain).
103. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 124 (describing that as the permissible uses of soft money
expanded, the amount of soft money raised and spent increased exponentially).
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donations and coordinated expenditures.'°4 The ever-growing mountain
of evidence indicates that there has been an enduring "wink and nod"
status quo, consisting of the willingness of people and business interests
to pay people for access to the government and the willingness of our
representatives to trade influence or access for money.' 0 5
The deference that the Supreme Court majority paid to the proponents of BCRA relates to the idea that Congress simply recognized the
number of problems riddling the election campaign finance law, and
passed a bill to remedy them and restore order to the system. In recognizing the intent of the sponsors and the governmental interests underlying a number of the new provisions, the McConnell majority found that
much of BCRA was necessarily tailored narrowly to the problems that
existed.' 0 6 Much of this was exemplified in the discussion over the
BCRA provisions banning national parties' involvement with soft
money. The majority saw past the narrow scope of Justice Kennedy's
approach to defining improper influence, 10 7 and acknowledged that "[ojf
'almost equal' importance has been the Government's interest in combating the appearance or perception of corruption engendered by large
campaign contributions."'0 8 The Court also noted that "[b]oth common
sense and the ample record... confirm" that soft-money contributions
to national party committees have a corrupting influence or create the
appearance of corruption.' 0 9
Just as Justice Kennedy found that BCRA's definition of corruption
is too broad, Senator McConnell claimed that the Act's restriction on the
solicitation and direction of soft money is too extensive, and that the
alternative of soliciting hard money for state and local candidates is a
nonexistent one." 0 The majority rejected the argument because the
"restriction on solicitation follows sensibly from the prohibition on
national committees' receiving soft money [in that a national committee
is likely to be appreciative of a donation it requested,] regardless of
whether the recipient is the committee itself or another entity.""'
Moreover, the Court noted that "[t]his principle accords with common
2
sense" and emerges in other federal laws. 1
104. See generally McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 439-522 (D.D.C. 2003).
105. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 144-54.
106. See, e.g., id. at 167 ("As we explain ... § 323(b) is narrowly focused on regulating
contributions that pose the greatest risk of this kind of corruption.").
107. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 291-92 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in

part).
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at 143.
Id. at 145 (emphasis added).
See id. at 157, n.52.
id. at 157-58 (emphasis added).
Id. at 158 (emphasis added).
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The McConnell majority promoted its common sense more subtly
to limit the breadth with which the "solicit" and "direct" provision of
BCRA should be interpreted. Senator McConnell asserted that the section is unconstitutional because it interferes impermissibly with the ability of national committees to associate with nonfederal party
committees." 3 Nevertheless, the Court determined that McConnell's
claim-that the restriction on association prevents the Republican
National Committee from executing a plan to act with state and local
party committees to implement joint fundraising efforts-is an "unnaturally broad reading of the terms."1' 14 Nothing on the face of the statute
prevents the national and local committees from working together and
electioneering in this capacity, "[a]s long as the national party officer
does not personally spend, receive, direct, or solicit soft money.""''
The debate over the soft-money regulations in Title I of BCRA
continued in the discussion in Shays, as it brought to the forefront an
inherent conflict between the certainty of the bright-line rules suggested
in the FEC regulations and the catch-all nature that underlies the BCRA
provision, seemingly propelled by the common sense of its authors. The
Commission defended the narrow definitions for "solicit" and "direct" in
its regulation" 6 by explaining its concern that these bright lines (or
loopholes, depending upon one's point of view) were written into the
Commission's regulations to protect the freedoms of speech and association of people who would otherwise be unsure about the limits of the
law.' 17 Nevertheless, Shays supported his claim that the plain meanings
of the two terms were far broader than the definitions promulgated by
the Commission." 8 The district court humored the Commission by
looking at various dictionaries for definitions corresponding to the ones
used by the FEC." 9 In the end, however, the Court understood that the
aim of the BCRA provision was to halt the national parties' involvement
with nonfederal money, and that Congress intended the terms to "cover
conduct beyond 'ask[ing]' for nonfederal donations to be given to other
entities."' 12 0

113. See id. at 159.
114. Id. at 160.
115. Id.
116. See 11 C.F.R. § 300.2(m)-(n) (2005).
117. See Shays v. FEC, 337 F. Supp. 2d 28, 74 (D.D.C. 2004).
118. Id.at 74.
119. Id.at 76 ("[T]he FEC's definition of the term 'direct' as meaning 'to ask' is a definition
foreign to every dictionary brought before this Court. It is difficult to deem a construction
permissible when it does not comport with any definition of the statutory term.").
120. Id.at 78.
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APPEAL OF SHAYS

After the district court decision in Shays, the battle moved to the
next level. Both sides were armed and ready with dictionaries in
hand.1 2 1 The FEC appealed the Shays district court decision on five of
the regulations that it was commanded to rewrite to the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. 12 2 The appellant
relied partially on some of the same arguments that it had used unsuccessfully in the lower court, but supplemented its assertions with
requests and justifications for deference to its decisions.12 3 Most notably, the FEC maintained that "asking" is the best bright-line definition
for both "soliciting" and "directing" funds to a candidate or party, and
that the terms "serve distinct but complementary purposes." 124 In
defense of providing a de minimis reporting exemption for those who
are working under the Levin Amendment, the FEC claimed that it was
well within the scope of its regulatory power to establish such an allowance because Congress failed to take a "rigid approach" in enacting the
Amendment itself.12 5 Similarly, in much of the rest of its argument, the
FEC criticized Congress for a failure to act on the issues presented, and
claimed that legislative inaction gave the Commission a right to step in
and regulate where Congress could not. 126 This argument was most
prominent in the FEC's appeal of the decision on content standards for
coordinated expenditures, on which Congress, purportedly, was unable
to agree on a definition. 127 The Commission also continued to use the
justification of protecting First Amendment rights in establishing other
12 8
bright-line regulations.
Even though the appellees clearly came out the victors at the district court, they urged strongly that all of the challenged regulations are
facially invalid because they violate the language of FECA or BCRA, or
both.' 29 Shays and Meehan delved into dictionaries, grammatical construction, and past uses of "solicit" and "direct" by the Supreme Court to
establish that the Commission's definitions of those words are com121. See Brief for the FEC at 22, Shays v. FEC, 414 F.3d 76 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (No. 04-5352);
see also Brief for Christopher Shays and Martin Meehan at 29-30, Shays v. FEC, 414 F.3d 76
(D.C. Cir. 2005) (No. 04-5352).
122. See Brief for the FEC, supra note 121, at 2.
123. See id. at 23-28.
124. Id. at 26.
125. Id. at 37-38.
126. See id. at 29-34.
127. See id.
128. See id. at 23 (arguing that the FEC's regulatory definition of the terms 'solicit' and
'direct' would prevent the imputation of intent in a private conversation where a person had no
intention of soliciting a contribution).
129. See Brief for Christopher Shays and Martin Meehan, supra note 121, at 20-21.
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pletely nonsensical relative to the text of the statutes. 3 ' The appellees
also claimed that the FEC's "safe harbor" regulation, which permits
coordinated expenditures without the use of express advocacy, is facially
contrary to FECA (and distinguished from permissible temporal provi31
sions) because the law regulates coordinated expenditures year round.'
They emphasized that the major BCRA modifications were meant to
strengthen the restrictions on candidates and parties, and that the FEC
1 32
regulatory loopholes are counterproductive.
In keeping with recent judicial precedent, the circuit court kept the
BCRA opponents from abating the progress of campaign finance reform.
The circuit court's majority analysis was similar to that of the district
court in that it broadly interpreted the McConnell Supreme Court majority, continued the ongoing campaign finance debate that began long
before McConnell, and reasoned much of its opinion from the judges'
own common sense.
The circuit court's broad interpretation of McConnell is limited in
the number of times it cites the Supreme Court, but most of the references made by the majority closely follow the opinion of the district
court. For example, with regard to the issue of soft money and the manner in which the FEC regulations should characterize "solicit" and
"direct," both courts based their analyses' 3 3 on McConnell's view of
"Congress' effort to plug the soft-money loophole."1'34 Even though the
FEC claimed the "need for clear definitions to avoid ambiguity, vagueness and confusion as to what ... would constitute solicitations,"' 35 the
circuit court found that the "FEC's definitions fly in the face of this
purpose because they reopen the very loophole the terms were designed
to close."' 3 6 In addition, the Supreme Court's classification of "Federal
election activity" as a "prophylactic rule" affected the district court's
interpretation,' 3 7 and enabled the Shays circuit court majority to infer
that "nothing in the [definition of Federal election activity] suggests congressional intent[ ] to deregulate federal activity."' 3 8
In its treatment of Title II of BCRA, the district court degraded
Buckley's express advocacy magic-words requirement even more than
McConnell's "functionally meaningless" description, by labeling the
130. See id. at 29-34.
131. See id. at 22-25.
132. See id. at 36-37.
133. See Shays v. FEC, 414 F.3d 76 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Shays v. FEC, 337 F. Supp. 2d 28, 78
(D.D.C. 2004).
134. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 133 (2003).
135. Contribution Limitations and Prohibitions, 67 Fed. Reg. 69,928, 69,942 (Nov. 19, 2002).
136. Shays, 414 F.3d at 106.
137. Shays, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 113.
138. Shays, 414 F.3d at 111.
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words themselves as undesirable and ineffective.139 The circuit court
followed a slightly different path, because of the way it conducted its
analysis under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resource Defense Council.'4 0 The district court struck down the regulation under the second
Chevron step, because to "exclude certain types of communications
regardless of whether or not they are coordinated would create an
immense loophole" and the potential for abuse.' 4 ' The circuit court, on
the other hand, struck down the regulation because its "fatal defect is not
that the FEC drew distinctions based on content, time, and place, but
rather that, contrary to the APA, the Commission offered no persuasive
justification for the . . . 120-day time-frame and the weak restraints
applying outside of it."' t4 2 It found that such a regulation "requires some
cogent explanation" because it employs the standard that McConnell
determined to be functionally meaningless, and that the FEC "allowed a
communication free-for-all for much of each election
coordinated
3
cycle."'

14

The circuit court's appeals for cogent arguments were limited
neither to instances in which it interpreted McConnell broadly nor to the
issue of soft money. In discussing payments to state and local party
committee employees under BCRA, the circuit court recognized that in
imposing additional constraints on federal election activities (FEA),
Congress neither intended to deregulate non-FEA expenses nor support
the exclusion of non-FEA salaries.' 4 4 The court then declared the FEC
regulation that allows state or local committee employees who spend
less than twenty-five percent of their time on FEA activities to be paid
from nonfederal funds, 145 to be:
particularly irrational given the FEC's recognition that costs for...
all matters, like salaries, that the FEA definition specifically
addresses, may require allocation even when the activities "do not
qualify" as FEA. In sum, the FEC has construed a BCRA provision
sweeping state activities within FECA as an excuse to punt federal
activities outside it. Because this "implication" from the statute
makes no sense, and because the Commission gave no other justification for its rule, the regulation exempting 25%-or-less salaries from
139. Shays, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 58 n.28.
140. See Shays, 414 F.3d at 96 (referring to the two-step analysis set forth in Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), which first asks whether
Congress has directly spoken regarding the question in issue, and second, if the agency's
interpretation is reasonable when Congress has not spoken).
141. Shays, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 65.
142. Shays, 414 F.3d at 100.
143. Id.

144. Id. at 112.
145. 11 C.F.R. § 300.33(c)(2) (2005).
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allocation is arbitrary and capricious. 116
The best illustrated example of the circuit court's longing for common sense appears in its review of the dispute over electioneering communications. BCRA had outlined the definition of an electioneering
communication, including a definition that applies only to communications "made within" specified time periods.14 7 In construing this phrase,
the FEC's regulation defines "made" to mean "publicly distributed,"' 4 8
and then defines "publicly distributed" to mean "aired, broadcast, cablecast or otherwise disseminated for a fee through the facilities of a television station, radio station, cable television system, or satellite
system."' 4 9 The appellees were concerned that free public service
announcements would become the next type of campaign advertisement
loophole if such a regulation were to remain. 5 °
A communication "is made" on the date of transmission, which is
when the advertisement may influence the election. 1"5 ' Accordingly, it
makes no sense to say that the communication is "made" only if someone paid a fee, an event that likely occurred earlier. 5 2 The FEC's argument was that the BCRA definition of electioneering communication did
not mention funding.' 5 3 The circuit court responded, "[t]rue, but so
what? ... When Congress bans possession of a firearm or cocaine, we

hardly scratch our heads and ask, 'Gee, maybe they meant possession
for a fee?' By the same token, when BCRA says 'made,' we presume
*

.

.that it means 'made' and not 'made for a fee.' ,,154

Clearly, each side thought that this battle over definitions, deference, and distributions was one worth winning. As the FEC addresses
its responsibility of redrafting the regulations to accord with the purpose
and textual meaning of BCRA, two realizations become apparent: the
DC Circuit's decision will go a long way in framing the issues and
guidelines for the Commission and, for at least this round, the BCRA
sponsors have won the campaign finance reform debate.
IV.

WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED?

The campaign finance reform battle has developed such that it pre-

vents McConnell from being understood in a legal vacuum. McCon146. Shays, 414 F.3d at 112.

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(i) (Supp. II 2002).
11 C.F.R. § 100.29(a)(2) (2005).
Id. § 100.29(b)(3)(i) (emphasis added).
Shays, 414 F.3d at 108.
Id.

Id.
Brief for the FEC at 41-42, Shays v. FEC, 414 F.3d 76 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (No. 04-5352).
Shays, 414 F.3d at 108.
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nell's importance lies subtly in its role as an arena of contestation in this
ongoing debate, rather than plainly as a notable chapter in the history of
federal election law jurisprudence. The Supreme Court's opinion can
neither be read without the reasoning and examples used in the special
panel decision, nor without the construction of it in Shays, which highlights McConnell's lasting precedent. As a result, Shays, a separate lawsuit from McConnell with a de facto difference in parties, appears to be a
continuation of McConnell. It needs to be so, to help illustrate our exercise in democracy.
Evaluating the importance of McConnell requires that one examine
this debate in its entirety. Shays is so es.sential to deciphering McConnell because the FEC regulations implement BCRA and other election
laws. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit denied the FEC's petition for rehearing en banc, so the extent to
which McConnell and Shays will endure as significant jurisprudence is
dependent upon the debate's return to the regulatory arena. If the Commission again takes wide latitude in interpreting BCRA and implementing its corresponding regulations, then the FEC can continue to modify
or hinder the effectiveness of BCRA freely. In response, Congress can
either restructure the agency so that it is more receptive to the will of
Congress or eliminate the FEC altogether and find a new way to promulgate campaign finance regulations. The most palpable effects of this
debate cannot be realized until the Commission takes the time it needs to
promulgate new regulations before the 2006 elections. Even when the
regulations are redrawn, it is foreseeable that they would encounter legal
challenges not unlike the ones they recently underwent.
Regardless of the types of challenges that these or future laws and
regulations may face, for the foreseeable future it seems that McConnell
will continue to be interpreted as it has hitherto been construed in Shays.
However, the foreseeable future in this case lasts only as long as the
composition of the federal courts, especially the Supreme Court, remains
similarly ideologically balanced. BCRA was hotly contested at the
Supreme Court in McConnell, and three of the five titles of the Act were
held unconstitutional.' 5 5 Similarly, the per curiam special panel McConnell opinion could only be reached on Title II, and each judge wrote a
separate opinion about the soft-money regulations in Title 1.156 The
Supreme Court majority referred to Judge Kollar-Kottely's opinion
repeatedly, and it was natural that the district court in Shays gave considerable deference to that opinion as well. Anticipating whether
McConnell will be interpreted in a similar manner at the Supreme Court
155. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
156. See McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176 (D.D.C. 2003).
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level matters: just as the federal courts have recently decided how to
construe the definitions of certain words and the effects of certain regulations, future courts will look at the cases involved in this debate as
precedent and decide whether today's courts had enough foresight to
handle the situation correctly. Regardless of the makeup of the Court,
sharp ideological divisions within Congress and a process featuring
numerous arenas of contestation mean that another round of debate is to
follow. However, the current debate grew from thirty years of experience since the last debate in Buckley. The debate to follow could be just
as far removed.
The wave of new precedent established by McConnell and new
political standards stemming from this round of the debate create ripples
on a larger and more fundamental scale than an examination with a legal
microscope can capture. All of the political jockeying and battling for
supremacy are so important because they affect the basic constructs of
our democratic government. Our government is supported necessarily
by the confidence and trust of the governed. Thus, the ways and extent
to which the governed participate in the functioning of our system is
essential. The least informed citizens and the political pundits alike are
skeptical about the motives and dealings of many of the politicians we
elect; consequently, we question the sincerity of the system as a whole.
This understanding makes the appearance of corruption as important as it is to the Court and the legislators who are trying to affect
change. The civic-minded among us spend so much time trying to get
others to vote in our elections, and there may be a reason other than
laziness to explain why people do not want to get involved in exercising
their rights. Common sense tells us that skeptical people do not vote
because they think voting is useless and does not effect change. Consequently, the campaign finance debate is a microcosm of the discourse
concerning how our society should be run, and which values should dictate the functioning of our government.
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